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The renowned international lawyer and judge Sir Hersch Lauterpacht
wrote "as a rule, the political activities of states in the field of
international relations are primarily devoted to safeguarding collective
economic interests, no matter under what disguise they happen to
appear." 1 Although penned a century ago, Sir Lauterpacht's assertion still
* Sayed M. Zonaid is an attorney specializing in federal litigation and appeals in West
Palm Beach Beach, Florida. He graduated from the University of Florida, Levin College of Law
in 2014, where he was Articles Editor of the FloridaJournalof InternationalLaw. While in law
school, he also served as research assistant to Professor Berta Esperanza Hernndez-Truyol, who,
along with fellow Levin College of Law Professor Stephen Joseph Powell, authored JUST TRADE:
ANEW COVENANT LINKING TRADE AND HUMAN RIGHTS.
1. HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, PRIVATE LAW SOURCES AND ANALOGIES OF INTERNATIONAL
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holds true even today. Indeed, when one examines the engine powering
the relentless spread of globalization today one finds the neoclassical
notion of free trade. 2 Applied to international trade, the neoclassical
school of economics emphasizes the importance of economic
liberalization by way of open markets and unburdened trade. 3 More
specifically, the neoclassical trade theory uses the Ricardian comparative
endowments
advantage theory to demonstrate how resource
4
trade.
to
decision
state's
a
color
(capital/labor ratios)
At its core, the World Trade Organization (WTO) represents the
convergence and crystallization of neoclassical ideas into a tangible
international political institution. 5 The WTO seeks to promote and, where
applicable, enforce the neoclassical notion of unfettered trade. 6 With 159
states currently endorsing its framework, 7 the WTO can rightly be
described as a resounding triumph of neoclassical economics in the
international arena.
Viewed from the perspective of human rights, however, there is a
darker side to the meteoric ascent of neoclassical economics and the
influential institutions that adhere to it such as the WTO.8 Critics argue,
for example, that free trade results in the exploitation of developing
countries by promoting the overuse of the resources that comprise their
comparative advantage. 9 Moreover, rules promoting free trade generally
limit the ability of states to place economic sanctions' on states engaging
in human rights violations.'1 Owing to the "splendid isolation"12 in which
international trade and human rights norms have emerged, critics have
also argued that trade law has failed to encourage compliance with human

LAW: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 72-73 (Archon Books, reprint

1970) (Longmans, Green and Co. Ltd., 1927).
2. See generally NATALIE GOLDSTEIN, GLOBALIZATION AND FREE TRADE (2008).
3.

RICHARD L. BERNAL, GLOBALIZATION, TRADE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: THE

CARIFORUM-EU ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT 120 (2013).

4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, MEMBERS AND OBSERVERS (2013), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis_e/tif e/org6_e.htm [hereinafter MEMBERS AND
OBSERVERS].

8. BERTA ESPERANZA HERNANDEZ-TRUYOL & STEPHEN J.POWELL, JUST TRADE: A NEW
COVENANT LINKING TRADE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 4 (2009).

9.

Id.

10. As human rights conditions do not typically impact the quality of goods, a WTO
Member will violate Article I (Most Favored Nation) of the GATT if they ban products from a
specific Member country. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. I, 61 Stat.

A-I1, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 (General Most-Favored-Nation Treatment) [hereinafter GATT].
11.
12.

HERNANDEZ-TRUYOL & POWELL, supra note 8, at 7.
Id.
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rights norms.'
Although violations of the most serious degree are alleged, such as
human trafficking and child enslavement, no significant progress has
been made with respect to linking human rights with market access within
the WTO. 14 In fact, the WTO's conspicuous silence on the issue of labor
standards and human rights law in general has been a source of
continuous ire for critics of globally integrated markets. 15 Currently, the
only WTO provision referencing labor standards is Article XX(e) of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which allows WTO
Members to prohibit the importation of prison labor products.16 However,
like many of the justified violations to the WTO, this provision is not
easily invoked, as the chapeau of Article XX presents evidentiary hurdles
to be surmounted before the exception is met. 17 In addition to meeting an
exception listed under Article XX, the chapeau requires that the excepted
measure be implemented in a manner that does not constitute "a means
of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the
same conditions prevail."' 8 Moreover, the excepted
measure cannot also
19
be "a disguised restriction on international trade."'
Criticisms aside, however, it would be erroneous to say that the WTO
has not at all impacted the global human condition. 2 ' Trade and
globalization, for example, has and will continue to be a major force in
eradicating poverty. 2 1 By increasing business profits and spurring
technological innovation, trade benefits rich and poor consumers alike by
decreasing the prices of goods and services. 22 For developing nations in
particular, trade raises living standards and creates new, previously
unavailable jobs and opportunities. 23 Vividly illustrating this
phenomenon is the fact that during the late 20th century, an era
characterized by increased participation in free trade agreements, the
percentage of people around the world living on an adjusted two dollars
per day fell from forty-four percent to an astonishing eight percent.24
13. Id. at 5.
14. Drusilla K. Brown et al., Labor Standards and Human Rights: Implications for
InternationalTrade and Investment 1 (IPC Working Paper Series No. 119, Univ. of Michigan,
2011), available at http://ipc.umich.edu/working-papers/pdfs/ipc-119-brown-deardorff-sternlabor-standards-human-rights-intemational-trade-investment.pdf.
15. Id.
16. GATT, supra note 10, art. XX (General Exceptions).
17.

Id.

18.
19.
20.
21.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

22.

HERNANDEZ-TRUYOL & POWELL, supranote 8, at 6.

23.
24.

Id.
Id.
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Amazingly, during that period, the population of the world increased by
two-thirds. 25 Indeed, so great has the impact of trade been that Clive
far from being
Crook has written in the Economist that, "Globalization,
26
cure."
feasible
only
its
is
poverty,
of
the greatest cause
Apart from stimulating economic development, free trade also plays
an important role in reducing the global conflict. 27 In a free trade setting,
where interstate violence has the potential to disrupt the continuous flow
of trade, states are less likely to engage in acts of aggression. 28 Even
accounting for factors such as the size of the actor and geographic
proximity-the main considerations of the gravity model 29 of
international relations-this fact holds true. 30 Truly, given that disastrous
global conflicts have ensued from the erection of trade barriers, free
trade's role in promoting comity and interdependence between states
cannot be understated. 3 '
Although a number of specialized international organizations tackle
human rights issues, few, if any, can match the WTO with respect to
compliance. 32 Currently, respondent states comply with adverse
decisions rendered by the WTO over ninety percent of the time.33 If taken
as true, Sir Lauterphact's assertion 34 regarding the international behavior
of states sheds light on why the WTO is so successful in this regard. If
the ultimate objective of states in the international arena is to safeguard
collective economic interests, then it follows that states would acquiesce
to the demands of an organization specifically designed to dispense and
guard those economic interests. Noneconomic concerns, such as human
rights, are, under this line of reasoning, secondary objectives, and, as
such, inspire deference so long as they are incidental to the economic
interests of states.
25.

Id.

26. Clive Crook, GlobalisationandIts Critics,ECONOMIST (Sept. 27, 2001).
27. H~vard Hegre et al., Trade Does Promote Peace: New Simultaneous Estimates of the
ReciprocalEffects of Trade and Conflict, 47 J. PEACE RES. 763, 771-72 (2010) (confirming that
even after accounting for size and proximity, trade promotes peace).
28. Id.

29. A theory of international economics, gravity models of international relations uses
economic size and geographic proximity to predict trade flows. THE GRAVITY MODEL IN
INTERNATIONAL TRADE: ADVANCES AND APPLICATIONS I (Peter A. G. van Bergeijk & Steven
Brakman eds., 2010).
30. Hegre et al., supra note 27, at 771-72.
31.

John Forrer et al., How Business Can FosterPeace, U.S. INST. OF PEACE, Sept. 7, 2012,

at 3.
32. Gary Horlick & Judith Coleman, A Comment on Compliance with WTO Dispute
Settlement Decisions, in THE WTO: GOVERNANCE, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT & DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 771, 772 (Merit E. Janow et al. eds., 2008).
33. Roger P. Alford, The Self-Judging WTO Security Exception, 2011 UTAH L. REv.697,
697-98 (2011).
34. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 1, at 72-73.
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Regardless of what makes the WTO successful, what is perhaps most
important to human rights activists today is that trade is power in the
modem world. With trillions of dollars being exchanged in trade yearly,
trade is an enormously lucrative enterprise--one hardly any state can
afford to ignore. 3 5 For this reason, as the WTO holds enormous sway on
matters of trade, it is an institution that should be utilized in the global
struggle for human rights.36 Given WTO's influence, unprecedented
compliance with human rights could be achieved.37 Used as an instrument
of leverage, for example, market access can be used to cease violations
of human rights in targeted countries as it38has the power to deteriorate a
state's political and economic well-being.
However, there is a problem with the view of human rights proponents
and that is it ignores the possibility that the WTO's relative flaws with
respect to human rights are what is driving its success. As a specialized
body with explicitly enumerated rights and powers, it is doubtful that the
WTO was intended to continuously address matters beyond its prescribed
limits.39 Indeed, if the WTO abandons its specific focus, there is a risk
that its influence will wane. As treaties are functionally contractual
agreements between states, 40 the introduction of new rights and
obligations into the WTO has the potential to provoke hostility and
resistance from Members-particularly from those who expect their
interests to be harmed by injection of new rights and obligations.
The purpose of this Article is to demonstrate that while human rights
considerations can play an important role in the WTO, such
considerations cannot play an excessive role in WTO affairs. As a
specialized international body devoted to trade, the WTO must accord its
place of pride to trade. Unless the current framework of the WTO is
modified, trade will and should be the focal point of the WTO's energies.
Indeed, for the sake of institutional integrity and continued stability, it is
preferable for the WTO to retain its narrow focus.

35. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, INTERNATIONAL TRADE STATISTICS 2013, at8 (2013).
36. HERNANDEZ-TRUYOL & POWELL, supra note 8, at 5.
37. Id.
38. Susan Ariel Aaronson, Human Rights, in PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENT POLICIES
FOR DEVELOPMENT: A HANDBOOK 431 (Jean-Pierre Chauffour & Jean-Christophe Maur eds.,
World Bank Publ'ns 2011).
39. Gabrielle Marceau, WTO Dispute Settlement and Human Rights, 13 EUR. J. IT'L L.

755 (2002).
40. See generally William W. Park & Alexander A. Yanos, Treaty Obligations and
NationalLaw: Emerging Conflicts in InternationalArbitration, 58 HASTNGS L.J. 251 (2006).
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II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF THE WTO

A. Legal FoundationsandLimits
The Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization (WTO Agreement) is a treaty under Article 38(1)(a) of the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) Statute, 4 1 and, as such, its terms and
the additional agreements referenced therein (the covered agreements)
42
are binding on Members of the WTO and even the organization itself.
By the very terms of its establishing treaty, the WTO is an organization
with limited scope and jurisdiction. 43 Article 11(1) of the WTO agreement
provides that "the WTO shall provide the common institutional
framework for the conduct of trade relations among its Members in
matters related to the agreements and associated legal instruments
included in the Annexes to this Agreement. 44 Within the context of a
treaty, the use of "shall" is authoritative in nature and denotes a
mandatory obligation.45 As treaties bind states only to the reasonable
extent of the treaty's terms, states are not obliged to defer to an
organization governed by a treaty acting beyond or contrary to its
prescribed framework.46
With respect to treaty interpretation, the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties (VCLT) is instructive. 47 Article 31(1) of the VCLT
provides that "A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their
context and in the light of its object and purpose. '48 By referencing
context and purpose, Article 31(1) clearly provides for flexibility in
interpretation. 49 Indeed, as Professor Anthony D'Amato notes, the
substance of this provision is to negate "unintended and literal
interpretations of words that might result in one50 of the parties gaining an
unfair or unjust advantage over another party."
41.

Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1), June 26, 1945, 33 U.N.T.S. 993.

42. DAVID PALMETER & PETROS C. MAVROIDIS, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN THE WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 49 (2004).
43. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, at

1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
44. Id.
45. Germana D'Acquisto & Stefania D'Avanzo, The Role of SHALL and SHOULD in Two
InternationalTreaties, in 3 CRITICAL APPROACHES TO DISCOURSE ANALYSIS ACROSS DISCIPLINES

36,40 (2009).
46. Id.at 38.
47. Id.
48. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331 [hereinafter VCLT].
49. ANTHONY D'AMATO, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 599 (Rudolf Bernhard
ed., 1992).

50.

Id.
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Although the WTO is bound by explicit limits, the interpretative
function of the dispute settlement nevertheless provides a living quality
to the treaties comprising the WTO. On occasion, the Appellate Body has
interpreted provisions of the WTO agreements as containing rights and
obligations not readily discernable from the text of the agreement.51 In
the Korea-Beef decision, for example, the Appellate Body elucidated
the meaning of the word "necessary" as it appeared in Article XX(d) of
the GATT.52 Rejecting Korea's argument that a dual retail system for
distributing beef was necessary to prevent consumer fraud, the Appellate
Body stated:
[I]n the context of Article XX(d), the reach of the word
''necessary" is not limited to that which is "indispensable" or "of
absolute necessity" or "inevitable".... [O]ther measures, too, may
fall within the ambit of this exception. As used in Article XX(d),
the term" necessary" refers, in our view, to a range of degrees of
necessity. At one end of this continuum lies "necessary"
understood as "indispensible"; at the other end, is "necessary"
taken to mean as "making a contribution to." We consider that a
"necessary" measure is, in this continuum, located significantly
closer to the pole of "indispensible" than to the opposite pole of
simply "making a contribution to".

[D]etermination of whether a measure, which is not
"indispensable", may nevertheless be "necessary" within the
contemplation go Article of XX(d), involves in every case a
process of weighing and balancing a series of factors which
prominently include the contribution made by the compliance to
the enforcement of the law or regulation at issue, the importance
of the common interests or values protected by that law or
regulation, and the accompanying impact of the law or regulation
on imports or exports.53
As applied to the specific facts of Korea-Beef, the Appellate
Body honed in on the reasonable availability of alternate measures
51.

FEDERICO ORTINO & ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMAN, THE WTO DisPuT

SETTLEMENT

SYsTEM 1995-2003, at 203 (2004). For example, "Article XX(d) has been invoked not
infrequently, but panels have generally rejected the defense on the grounds that the GATTinconsistent measure is not necessary." Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. (quoting Appellate Body Report on Korea-MeasuresAffecting Imports of Fresh,
Chilledand Frozen Beef, WT/DS161&169/AB/R, adopted on Jan. 10, 2001,
162, 164).
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in construing the meaning of necessity under Article XX(d).54 In
rejecting Korea's argument that an alternative measure must
guarantee the level of enforcement sought, the Appellate Body
held:
We are not persuaded that Korea could not achieve its desired level
of enforcement with respect to the origin of beef sold by retailers
using conventional WTO-consistent enforcement measures, if
Korea would devote more resources to its enforcements efforts on
the beef sector .... Korea's argument about the lack of resources
to police thousands of shops on a round-the-clock basis is, in the
end, not sufficiently persuasive. Violations of law and regulations
.. . can be expected to be routinely investigated and detected
through selective, but well-targeted, controls of potential
wrongdoers.

It is pertinent to observe that, through its dual retail system, Korea
has in effect shifted all, or the great bulk, of these potential costs
of enforcement ... to imported goods ... In contrast, the more
conventional, WTO-consistent measures of enforcement do
involve such onerous shifting of enforcement costs which
ordinarily are born by the Member's public purse.55
Although decided within the context of China's obli ations to grant
trade rights under its WTO Ascension Protocol, 56 the ChinaPublicationsand Audiovisual Products decision nevertheless illustrates
how the Appellate Body can even modify its own interpretations. 57 In
China-Publications and Audiovisual Products, the United States
brought a complaint against China alleging that the content review
mechanism and system China established to regulate the import of
publications, audiovisuals, and other media forms discriminated against
foreign suppliers of audiovisual services and foreign suppliers of
distribution services for publications. 58 In its defense, China invoked

54.
55.

Id.
Id.at 203-04.

56. See generally World Trade Organization, Protocol on the Accession of the People's
Republic of China, Decision of Nov. 10 2001, WT/L/432 (2001).
57. Appellate Body Report, China-MeasuresAffecting Trading Rights and Distribution
Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual EntertainmentProducts, WT/DS363/AB/R,
(Dec. 21, 2009) [hereinafter China-AudiovisualProducts].

58.

Id.

2-4.
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Article XX(a)
of thenecesary•
GATT, 59 which provides ,60
a general exception to
measres
measures "necessary to protect public morals."
In support of this
position, China contended that, given the public policies at stakespecifically "the cultural nuances of Chinese public morals"--the
61
execution of content review by State-owned entities was inevitable.
The Appellate Body did not agree with China and, in reaching its
decision, clarified the meaning of GATT Article XX(a)'s "public moral
exception." 62 Consistent with the Appellate Body's findings in other
cases dealing with Article XX of the GATT, the Appellate Body stated it
would analyze the "public morals" through "a sequential process of
63
weighing and balancing factors involved ("sequential balancing test").,
In applying the sequential balancing test and ultimately ruling against
China, however, the Appellate Body went beyond its approach in in
United States-Gambling Services, an earlier Appellate Body decision
dealing with an identically worded "public morals" exception to the
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).6 4 Unlike that case,
here, the Appellate Body, in examining the "less restrictive means"
element of the sequential balancing test of "necessity," stated that, despite
the fact that GATT Article XX(a) provides no guidance on the issue of
whether a panel may consider "only the restrictive effect the measures
have on imports of relevant products, or whether a panel may also
consider the restrictive effect of the measures on importers or potential
importers," there nevertheless may be instances where further inquir7
into the restrictive impacts on international commerce is appropriate.
The Appellate Body then proceeded to apply the "less restrictive means"
test to two types of restrictive impacts: first, "on the actual importation of
the subject goods," and then, "on the right to trade of those who wish to
66
engage in such importation in the future."
Aside from its elaboration of the language of GATT Article XX's
"public morals" exception, the Appellate Body also blurred evidentiary
burdens in regards to demonstrating reasonability of available
alternatives. 67 Here, although the United States proposed that the Chinese
government solely administer content review, it is not clear whether the
Panel required the United States to prove the reasonableness and

59. Id. 7.
60. GATT, supra note 10, art. XX(a) (General Exceptions).
61. Diane A. Desierto, Public Policy in International Investment and Trade Law:
Community Expectations andFunctionalDecision-Making,26 FLA. J. INT'L. L. 51, 77 (2014).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 77-78.
64. Id. at 77.
65. Id. at 77-78.
66. Id. at 78-79.
67. Id. at 79.
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feasibility of its suggested provision. 68 Indeed, the United States merely
asserted that considerable evidence existed for finding that China was
capable of executing the measure the United States advanced as China
was also performing a similar function for items such as films imported
for theatrical release and electronic publications. 69 Despite this, however,
the Appellate Body ultimately endorsed the Panel's methodology for
ascertaining the existence of reasonably available alternative measures
70
and provided no further guidance on the issue of requisite proof.
Although China-Publicationsand Audiovisual Products was the
first decision to interpret the public morals exception under Article XX
of the GATT, as previously noted, the Appellate Body analyzed an
71
identical exception under GATS in United States-GamblingServices.
In that case, Antigua challenged a medley of US laws regulating the
cross-border supply of gambling services as being inconsistent with the
United States' obligations under GATS.72 In response, the United States,
like China in the China-Publicationsand Audiovisual Products case,
invoked a public morals defense." GATS, like the GATT, provides an
exception for measures
"necessary to protect public morals or to maintain
74
public order.",
However, unlike in the China-Publications and Audiovisual
Products decision, the Appellate Body here merely identified the two
factors relevant in determining the "necessity" of a measure in light of
the "less restrictive means" element of the sequential balancing test.75
Moreover, with respect to evidentiary burdens, the Appellate Body here
unambiguously stated that it is the burden of the complaining party to
show that reasonably available alternative measures exist.76 In fact, it is
only when a complainingparty identifies a WTO-consistent alternative
that a res onding party must demonstrate the necessity of its challenged
measure.
B. WTO Case Law
Under Article 38(1)(d) of the Statute of the ICJ, "judicial decisions"
68. Id. at 79-80.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See generally Appellate Body Report, US.-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border
Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005) (in the context of
Article XIV(a) of the GATS).
72. Id. 2.
73. Id. 3.
74. Id. 74.
75. Desierto, supra note 61, at 76 n.82.
76. Id. at 79.
77. Id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol27/iss2/3
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78
are classified as non-binding secondary sources of international law.
Despite falling under this category, in practice, the decisions of prior
dispute settlement tribunals bind subsequent tribunals on the same
matter. 79 Truly, without such a system in place, the WTO would not enjoy
the efficiency it does today. If required to reinvent the wheel every time
a dispute arose, dispute settlement would move at a glacial pace.
Typically, nine months is all the time currently required to render a
verdict on the WTO-consistency of challenged measure. 80 By
international standards, nine months is a highly remarkable feat
considering that other international tribunals, such as the ICJ, proceed at
an excruciatingly slow pace. 81 Indeed, highlighting this fact is that in a
has decided more cases than the ICJ has in
little over 18 years, the WTO
82
existence.
of
years
over 60

C. Non- WTO Law in WTO Dispute Settlement
Generally speaking, the WTO has gravitated away from the nonrelevancy approach to non-WTO law taken by its predecessor the
GATT. 83 The decision of the GATT Panel in US.-Tuna II illustrates this
now outdated approach. 4 There, the Panel rejected arguments made
under treaties other than the GATT and stated "these treaties were not
relevant as a primary means of interpretation of the text of the General
Agreement. '' 85 In contrast to this older view, the Appellate Body has
stated in US.-Gasoline that Article 3.2 of the Dispute Settlement
Understanding (DSU), which states that the purpose of the WTO dispute
settlement is "to clarify the existing provisions of [WTO] agreements in
86
accordance with the customary rules of public international law,"
is not to
suggests "a measure of recognition that the General Agreement
87
be read in clinical isolation from public international law."
78. PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 42, at 51.
79. Id. at 55.
80. Marceau, supra note 39, at 759.
81.

John R. Crook, The InternationalCourtofJustice andHuman Rights, 1 Nw. U. J. INT'L

HUM. RTS. 6 (2004). Apart from being incredibly protracted, ICJ decisions also have a tendency
to be unwieldy and expensive. Id
82. Alford, supra note 33, at 697.
83. HOLGER P. HESTERMEYER, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE WTO: THE CASE OF PATENTS AND
AcCESS TO MEDIciNEs 223 (2007).

84. Id.
85. DSU, Dispute Settlement Rules: Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing
the Settlement of Disputes, art. 3.2, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 2, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 354 (1999), 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994)

[hereinafter DSU].
86. Id. at 223-24.
87. Id. at 223.
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Further evidence of this more inclusive approach to non-WTO is
88
found in the Appellate Body's decision in E.C.-ComputerEquipment.
There, the Appellate Body criticized the Panel for not considering, as
context under the VCLT, relevant non-WTO law-namely the
International Convention on the Harmonized Commodity Description
and Coding System and the rulings of the Harmonized System Committee
of the World Customs Organization-in interpreting a tariff schedule of
the European Community. 89 Going further, the Appellate Body even
suggested that the use of relevant treaties and other international
to the treaty in
documents is appropriate even where membership
90
question does not include all WTO members.
Other prominent examples of the Appellate Body encouraging the use
of non-WTO in dispute settlement can be found in the U.S.-Shrimp and
E.C.-Bananascases. 9 ' In U.S.-Shrimp, the Appellate Body stated that
terms of the GATT were not static and, in doing so, interpreted the
meaning of "natural resources" in Article XX(g) of the GATT by
examining outside sources such as the Convention on Biological
92
Diversity and U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
Similarly, in E.C.-Bananas, the Appellate Body consulted the Lom6
Convention in analyzing a waiver granted to the European Community
by the WTO. 93
Finally, although not a decision of the Appellate Body, the Panel in
E.C.-Biotech also addressed the issue of using non-WTO law in
interpreting WTO Agreements. 94 In doing so, however, the Panel went
further than any decision before it.95 Referencing both Article 31(3)(c)
("any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations
between the parties") 9 6 and 3 1(1) of the VCLT (good faith interpretation
of treaties), 9 7 the Panel concluded that non-WTO treaties may be
consulted even where the disputing parties have not adopted those
treaties.98 The Panel further noted that the mere fact that parties are not
members to a particular treaty "does not necessarily mean that a
convention cannot shed light on the meaning and scope of a treaty term
to be interpreted." 99
88.

HESTERMEYER, supra note 83, at 223-24.

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 224.
Id.
Id.
id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
VCLT, supra note 48, art. 31.
Id.

98.

HESTERMEYER, supra note 83, at 224.

99. Id. at 224-25.
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D. References to Human Rights in the WTO Framework
The WTO Agreements are noticeably silent on the issue of human
rights.100 Although the preamble to the WTO Agreement states that trade
relations "should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living,
ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of
real income," no explicit reference to human rights is provided. 10' Indeed,
Agreements provide, at best, only
when examined as a whole, the WTO
02
indirect references to human rights.1
Further evidence of the WTO's indirect approach to human rights is
provided in the TRIPS Agreement. 10 3 Article 7 ("Objectives") of the
TRIPS Agreement states:
[T]he protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights
should contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and
to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual
advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and
economic welfare, and to a
in a manner conducive to social 0and
4
obligations.'
and
rights
of
balance
Although language such as "conducive to social and economic
welfare" can encapsulate the concept of human rights, again, like the
the WTO Agreement, no explicit reference to human rights
preamble0 of
5
made.'
is
Despite the general silence of the WTO agreements on the issue of
human rights, WTO Members nevertheless have discretion to address
human rights concerns (whether at home or abroad) under the exceptions
found in Article XX of the GATT 06 Article XX(e), for example, allows
Members to adopt measures limiting the importation of prison labor
products-normally a violation of the Article I of the GATT
requirement. 0 7 Similarly, Article XX(a) permits "measures necessary to
protect public morals.' 0 Although difficult to invoke given the hurdles
associated with surmounting Article XX's chapeau and terms like
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

104. TRIPS: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, art. 7, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, The
Legal Texts: The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 320 (1999),
1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 323 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].

105.
106.

HESTERMEYER, supra note 83, at 101.
GATT, supranote 10, art. XX (General Exceptions).

107.
108.

Id.
Id.
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"necessary," once met, these exceptions override conflicting WTO
10 9
obligations.
Although they limit the ability of Members to pursue important policy
concerns like human rights compliance, the restrictions on the use of
Article XX exceptions nevertheless perform an important gatekeeping for
the WTO in that they test for genuineness on the part of the Member
raising the exception."10 The official position of the WTO is that such
measures exist to prevent Members from using issues like human rights
as a "smokescreen" (or guise) to justify protectionism."' Indeed, if the
mere invocation of human rights could waive obligations under the WTO,
a race to the bottom would ensure. Given the opportunity, Members
would scramble to erect barriers protecting politically popular but
relatively uncompetitive industries.
As the WTO is a member-driven, consensus-based organization,
however, human rights can play a larger role in WTO affairs if the
Members of the WTO, acting in unison, wish it to. 112 Indeed, this fact is
exemplified by the Waiver Concerning Kimberley Process Certification
Scheme for Rough Diamonds."l3 The Kimberley Process provides
certification to diamonds not originating in States in which an illegal
trade in diamonds is funding gross violations of human rights.1 14 Issued
by the WTO General Council in 2003, this waiver permits Members
participating in the Kimberley Process to ban imports of uncertified
diamonds-typically a violation of Article I of the GATT." 5
The "TRIPS waiver on compulsory licensing to make essential drugs
available to developing countries" is yet another example of WTO
Members acting collectively to address human rights issues.11 6 Adopted
by the General Council in August 2003 to address the increasing concerns
about health in developing countries, this waiver allows for "any leastdeveloped country Member or Member with insufficient pharmaceutical
manufacturing capacity to make use of the Decision to import any

109. Id.
110. World Trade Organization, 3d WTO Ministerial Conference, Top 10 Reasons to
Oppose the World Trade Organization?Criticism, Yes... Misinformation, No!, available at

https://www.wto.org/english/theWTO-e/minist- e/min99-e/english/misinf-e/
[hereinafter 3d WTO Ministerial Conference].

liste.htm

111.

Id.

112.
113.

Desierto, supra note 61, at 51.
See Decision of the General Council of May 15, 2003, Waiver ConcerningKimberley

Process Certification Scheme for Rough Diamonds, WT/L/518 (May 27, 2003) [hereinafter

Kimberley Waiver].
114. Desierto, supra note 61, at 53.
115. Kimberley Waiver, supranote 113.
116. See Decision of General Council, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha
Declarationon the TRIPS Agreement andPublic Health, WT/L/540 (Sept. 1, 2003).
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'1 17
pharmaceutical product needed to address public health problems."
Although TRIPS typically requires Members to extend protections to
intellectual property rights regardless of human rights concerns, this
waiver remarkably permits Members to bypass TRIPS if the Member is
the Council
either a least developed country or "has made a notification to' 18
importer."
an
as
system
the
use
to
for TRIPS of its intention

E. Lex Specialis
Under the doctrine of lex specialis, the more specific law takes
precedence over the more general."l 9 Through the use of this doctrine,
specialized international bodies are permitted to narrow their institutional
focus to a particular set of norms and remedies. Therefore, if the WTO
wishes to confine itself to matters of trade law, it is permitted to do so
under international law.
Given that the WTO is a member-driven organization, however,
consensus among Member governments may alter the scope and function
of the WTO at any time.1 20 In fact, as international organizations are
subjects of international law, the WTO has the ability to extend
recognition or seek membership in other treaty regimes.12 1 So far,
however, the WTO has not elected to join human rights convention nor
human rights obligations, as it is
can be said that the WTO is incurring
122
agency.
U.N.
specialized
not a
Despite the WTO's reluctance to assume outside obligations, the
WTO nevertheless maintains links with international bodies in the U.N.
system. 123 In fact, under Article V of the WTO Agreement, the WTO is
encouraged to reach out to other international organizations, as the
provision states, "The General Council shall make appropriate
arrangements for effective cooperation with other intergovernmental
124
organizations that have responsibilities related to those of the WTO."'
With respect to the United Nations, WTO relations are governed by the
"Arrangements for Effective Cooperation with other Intergovernmental
Organizations-Relations Between the WTO and the United Nations"

117. Emily Ng & Jillian Clare Kohler, Finding Flaws: the Limitations of Compulsory
Licensing for Improving Access to Medicines-An InternationalComparison, 16 HEALTH L.J.
143,146 (2008).
118. Id. at 150.
119. HERNANDEZ-TRUYOL & POWELL, supra note 8, at 69.
120. Desierto, supra note 61, at 51.
121. HESTERMEYER, supra note 83, at 100.
122. Id.
123. ARTHUR E. APPLETON & MICHAEL G. PLUMMER, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION:
LEGAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 72 (2005).

124.

WTO Agreement, supra note 43, art. V.
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signed on November 15, 1995.125 Under this arrangement, the WTO
126
coordinates various activities with the U.N. universe of organizations.
The WTO, for example, takes part, along with the executive heads of the
U.N. and Bretton Woods systems, in the Chief Executive Board for
Coordination.1 2 7 Lead by the U.N. Secretary General, this collection of
leaders seeks to align the vision of various specialized international
organizations on social, economic, and related matters.1 28 In addition,
although not a member of the U.N. Economic and Social Council
(ECOSOC), the WTO both engages in roundtable talks with the
ECOSOC on matters such as Financing for Development
and attends the
129
ECOSOC's Annual Ministerial Substantive review.
Although not related to the WTO's agreement with the United
Nations, another WTO link with the United Nations can be found in
Article XXI of the GATT. 3 ° Article XXI (security exceptions) provides
that "Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed . . . to prevent any
contracting party from taking any action in pursuance of its obligations
under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of international
peace and security."' 3 1 Under this provision, WTO Members are
permitted to place sanctions on Members-normally a violation of
WTO's nondiscrimination provisions-if the U.N. Security Council
acting pursuant to Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter authorizes those
sanctions.1 32 Notably, however, the security exceptions have not played
a significant role under either the GATT or WTO and this is perhaps for
the best. 33 Indeed, if Article XXI were frequently invoked, it is possible
that WTO operations would come to a grinding halt. Given Article XXI's
self-judging component (Members decide when measures are
appropriate) and its unclear reviewability by the WTO, one American
drafter of this provision commented that there "was a great danger of
having too wide an exception. . . that would permit anything under the
125. Arrangements for Effective Cooperation with other Intergovernmental OrganizationsRelations Between the WTO and the United Nations, WT/GC/W/10 Nov. 15, 1995 [hereinafter
WTO-U.N. Agreement].
126. Note by the Executive Director of the U.N. Environment Programme, United Nations
SpecialisedAgencies Versus UnitedNations Programmes3 (June 7, 2010), http://www.unep.org/

environmentalgovernance/Portals/8/dcuments/Speialized%2OAgency/o2vs%2Prgramme%
20IEG%20paper FINAL_07-06-10.pdf.

127.

Id

128.

Id.

129.
130.

Id.
GATT, supranote 10, art. XXI.

131. Id.
132. Gudrun Monika Zagel, WTO & Human Rights: Examining Linkages and Suggesting
Convergence, 2 IDLO VOICES OF DEVELOPMENT PAPER SERIES 7 (2005).
133. ARTHUR PETER VAN DEN BOsscHE & WENER ZDOUC, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 595 (2008).
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sun.",

134

III. FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS
Under Article XXIV of the GATT (Territorial Application-Frontier
Traffic-Customs Unions and Free-trade Areas), WTO Members are
permitted to formulate and adopt free trade agreements (FTAs) granting
' 35
rights and benefits in excess of those provided the GATT ("WTO plus"'
benefits essentially). 136 In relevant part, Article XXIV states, "the
provisions of this [GATT] shall not prevent, as between the territories of
contracting parties, the formation of a customs union or of a free-trade
area or the adoption of an interim agreement necessary for the formation
of a customs union or of a free-trade area."'1 37 Indeed, not only are such
agreements permitted, but they are also encouraged. 138 Article XXIV
further states that
The contracting parties recognize the desirability of increasing
freedom of trade by the development, through voluntary
agreements, of closer integration between the economies of the
countries parties to such agreements. They also recognize that the
purpose of a customs union or of a free-trade area should be to
facilitate trade between the constituent territories and not to raise
barriers to3 9the trade of other contracting parties with such
territories.'

Currently, 90% of all WTO Members are participants of either FTAs
or regional trade agreements (RTAs). 140 In fact, so popular are these
agreements that there are over 200 of them currently in effect. 141 Among
these agreements, the four most prominent are the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the European Union, Mercado Commiln del
sur or Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), and the Association of
134.
135.

Alford, supra note 33, at 698-99.
Masahiro Kawai & Ganeshan Wignaraja, Asian FTAs: Trends, Prospects, and

Challenges 17-18 (Asian Development Bank, Working Paper 226, 2010).
136. Monika Mrdzovd et al., Is the GA TT/WTO's Article XMlVBad?, 89 J. INT'L ECON. 216,
216-17 (2012).
137. GATT, supra note 10, art. XXIV(5).
138. Id. art. XXIV(4).
139. Id.
140. Mitsuo Matsushita, Legal Aspects ofFree Trade Agreements: In the Context ofArticle
XXIV of the GATT 1994, in WTO AND EAST ASIA PERSPECTIVES 497 (Mitsuo Matsushita &
Dukgeun Ahn eds., Cameron May 2004).
141. Colin B. Picker, Regional Trade Agreements v. the WTO: A Proposalfor Reform of
Article XXIV to Counterthis Institutional Threat, 26 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 267,270 (2005).
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Southeast Asian States (ASEAN). 142 Collectively, in the year 2000, these
four agreements accounted for 69.5%
of the global import trade and
43
64.54% of the global export trade.1
The popularity of these agreements lies in the fact that under these
agreements, WTO Members are free to address more contentious issues,
such as human rights and the environment. 144 Particularly with respect to
human rights, for example, NAFTA stands out, as it was among the first
agreements of its kind to address labor concerns. 145 Coming into force in
1994, NAFTA reduced or eliminated tariffs well beyond the WTO
between the United States, Canada, and Mexico.' 46 In exchange for
opening its doors, however, the United States insisted that labor rights
and environmental concerns be given due consideration in executing
NAFTA. 147 Among the obligations, for example, all three nations must
enforce its current laws and legislation regarding labor rights and that
48
each country strive to reduce its negative impact on the environment.
Apart from NAFTA, the European Union has also actively sought to
induce compliance to human rights through trade agreements. 49 Since
the 1990s, the preferential E.U. trade agreements have included "human
rights clauses."' 150 Typically, these clauses require that the parties to the
treaty "respect human rights and democratic principles." 51 One such
clause, for example, included in an agreement between the European
Union and Central America in 2012 provided
Respect for democratic principles and fundamental human rights,
as laid down in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and
for the principle of the rule of law, underpins the internal and
international policies of both52 Parties and constitutes an essential
element of this Agreement.1
As evidenced by NAFTA and European Union-Central agreements,
142.
143.
144.

Matshushita, supra note 140, at 497.
Id.
Id.

145.

David A. Gantz, Labor Rights and Environment Protection Under NAFTA and Other

US. Free TradeAgreements 9 (Arizona Legal Studies Discussion Paper No. 11-13,2011).
146. Id. at 29.
147. Id. at2.
148. Id.at 11, 17.
149. Lorand Bartels, Human Rights and SustainableDevelopment Obligations in EU Free
Trade Agreements 1 (University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Ser.
No. 24/2012, 2012).
150.
151.

Id.
Id.

152. Agreement Establishing an Association Between Central America, on the one hand,
and the European Union and its Member States, on the other art. 1, June 29, 2012, availableat
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfn?id=689.
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the scope of these agreements go beyond that of the GATT in that they
contain explicit references to human rights. 153 Whereas the GATT and
the WTO agreements are virtually silent on the issue of human rights and
contain no references to outside human rights instruments, these
agreements go as far as to embrace the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR), which although, being a declaration, is not
independently binding on states,' 54 includes a fairly extensive list of
human rights, such as the right to be free from slavery and the right to
freedom of expression. 155 Notably, labor rights are also featured
prominently in the UDHR as it "expressly recognizes the right to work;
free choice of employment; just and favorable conditions of work;
to
protection against unemployment; non-discrimination and the right 156
equal pay for equal work; and the right to form and join trade unions."

IV. THE CASE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

A. The Global Madhouse that Trade Built
Even considering the WTO's focus on trade law, the WTO does not
exist in a vacuum; rather the WTO, as evidenced by Article V of the WTO
Agreement, 157 operates in conjunction with the greater international
system-a system that happens to unequivocally demand respect for
human rights. Indeed, history, 158 textual evidence, 159 and WTO
jurisprudence 160 all suggest that collaboration with the public
international system at large is meant to a play role in guiding WTO
affairs. Given that our globalized world has given rise to globalized
problems, now, more than ever, is the time for the WTO to align its focus
with public international law and entities.
The problems faced by our world today are not ordinary problems.
These problems traverse borders and are largely invisible except to the
153.

JAN ORBIE & LISA TORTELL,

THE

EUROPEAN UNION AND THE SOCIAL DIMENSION OF

GLOBALIZATION: How THE EU INFLUENCES THE WORLD 67-68 (2009).
154. ERIC HEINZE, WAGING HUMANITARIAN WAR: THE ETHICS, LAW, AND POLITICS OF
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 65 (2009).

155. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810
(1948), art. 4, 19.
156. Gantz, supra note 145, at 8.
157. WTO Agreement, supra note 43, art. V.
158.

See HERNANDEZ-TRUYOL & POWELL, supranote 8, at 65.

159. See WTO Agreement, supra note 43, art. V.
160. See generally Panel Reports, European Communities-Measures Affecting the
Approval andMarketingofBiotech Products,WT/DS291/R / WT/DS292/R /WT/DS293/R (Nov.
2, 2006).
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individuals who come into contact with them. Pollution, blood diamonds,
and human trafficking are all products of our globalized world, but they
are also progeny of trade, as globalization itself is fueled by trade. Given
the link between trade and human rights, human rights proponents are
baffled at the fact that the WTO has not taken a more aggressive stance
on human rights. Perhaps now is also the time for the WTO to leave the
61
shade of "splendid isolation" and face the monsters it has helped create.'
Tracing the history and development of the public international
system, it can be inferred that all states were meant to be bound by human
rights norms-whether they are WTO Members or not. 162 During the
First and Second World Wars, the world witnessed an era of violence
unseen in the annals of history. Millions upon millions perished, and
millions more were subject to unfathomable horrors. State sanctioned use
of torture, genocide, and rape were fairly common instruments employed
to subjugate undesirable populations and silence dissidents.
Moved by these atrocities and the lack of moral restraint on the part
of individual States, the world community mobilized to secure perpetual
163
peace and buttress the burgeoning notion of universal human rights.
From this collective effort, the modern international system was born.
Beginning with the UN-the successor to the now defunct64 League of
Nations-a host of international organizations sprang forth. 1
It was during this era that global human rights instruments also
arose. 165 After the adoption of the landmark UDHR in 1948, two
subsequent conventions reinforced the ideas enshrined therein-the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR). 166 Owing to differences in political ideologies and cultural
nuances, many States have not ratified both treaties.' 67 Nevertheless, the
overwhelming majority168of today's States are members of either the
ICCPR or the ICESCR.
Regardless of the nature of these organizations and instruments,
however, the one commonality shared among them is that they all strive
to achieve a more humane international environment. Like the individual
cogs in a machine, each of these organizations and instruments work to
power the international system in its path to create a world without strife,
oppression, and abuse-one imbued with noble norms and the ability to
161.
162.

HERNANDEZ-TRUYOL & POWELL, supra note 8, at 7.
Id. at56.

163.

Id. at 52.

164.
165.

Id. at 53.
Id. at 56-57.

166.

Id.

167.
168.

Id. at 57.
Id. at 140-41.
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enforce-these norms. Indeed, in order to move beyond the barbarity of the
past, the world community had to guarantee the civility of the future.
Further evidencing the newfound global commitment to human rights
is the fact a new breed of customary international law protecting
universally recognized bedrock human rights arose-jus cogens or
preemptory norms. 169 Essentially "super" versions of international
customs, jus cogens norms include the right to be free from torture,
genocide, and slavery. These are norms from which no derogation is
permitted under any circumstances. 170 In fact, it is said to be the duty and
obligation of every State to vigorously prosecute violations of these
norms no matter where they occur.1 71 Indeed, so important arejuscogens
norms that they are recognized under the VCLT as having the ability to
override even treaties where they conflict.' 72 In relevant part, the Article
53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) states:
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a
peremptory norm of general international law. For the purposes of
the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general
international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the
international community of States as a whole as a norm from which
no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a
subsequent73norm of general international law having the same
character.
Human rights concerns, however, need not be captured under the
concept ofjus cogens to impose obligations on international actors. In the
BarcelonaTraction Case, for example, the ICJ stated
[A]n essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations
of a State towards the international community as a whole, and
those arising vis-a-vis another State in the field of diplomatic
protection. By their very nature the former are the concern of all
States. In view of the importance of the rights involved, all States
interest in their protection; they are
can be held to have a legal
174
obligations erga omnes.
The term erga omnes denotes an affirmative obligation imposed on
169.
170.

Id.at 15-16.
Id.

171. PHILIP ALSTON & RYAN GOODMAN, INTERNATIONAL HuMAN RIGHTS: THE SUCCESSOR
TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RiGHTs IN CONTEXT 164 (2013).
172. HERNANDEZ-TRUYOL & POWELL, supra note 8, at 19-20.
173. VCLT, supra note 48, art. 53 (emphasis added).
174. HUGH THIRLWAY, THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 147 (2014).
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states to respect and defend human rights.' 75 Under this characterization
of human rights, states are bound by human rights norms whether or not
they are WTO Members. As human rights derive from natural law and
because treaties cannot override natural law, 1 76 it makes no sense to say
that WTO Members leave their human rights obligations at the door when
they enter the WTO.
Despite the increased global focus on human rights, there still exists
much debate on the role human rights plays in the WTO. Sadly, much of
this debate stems from the fact that trade and human rights have
developed in a state of "splendid isolation" from one another.177 Fearing
the readiness to which the politicians of their era subscribed to harmful
economic policies (high tariff barriers) and the role such policies played
in inciting conflict during the early twentieth century, the architects of the
modem international system sought to move the world's economic and
financial entities away from the public U.N. system and into private
hands. 178 It is from this divide that we can trace the modem tension
179
between trade and human rights.
Attesting to the severity of this split, it is argued, for example, that the
WTO is a "self-contained regime."' 80 This argument states that the WTO
"operates, at least to some extent, in isolation from public international
law, which comprises human rights law, in that it seeks to maintain a
monopoly over interpretation and application of its law and it seeks to
exclude recourse to other fora."''81 If accepted as true, this
characterization of the WTO would prohibit recourse to outside law even
182
when dealing with the exception found under Article XX of the GATT.
A number of a key WTO provisions and decisions, however, clearly
undermine the idea that the WTO was meant to be a closed self-contained
regime. Article 3.2 of the DSU, for example, states the purpose of WTO
dispute settlement is "to clarify the existing provisions of [WTO]
agreements in accordance with the customary rules of public
internationallaw."'183 Reinforcing the notion encapsulated in Article 3.2
of the DSU, the Appellate Body stated in U.S.-Gasoline that Article 3.2
"reflects a measure of recognition that the General Agreement is not to
184
be read in clinical isolation from public international law."'
175.
176.
177.

ALSTON & GOODMAN, supra note 171, at 164.
HERNANDEZ-TRUYOL & POWELL, supra note 8, at 19.
Id. at7.

178.
179.

Id. at 64.
Id.

180. CHRISTIANE R. CONRAD, PROCESSES AND PRODUCTIONS METHODS (PPMs) IN WTO
LAW: INTERFACING TRADE AND SOCIAL GOALS 123 (2014).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. DSU, supra note 85, art. 3.2.
184. HESTERMEYER, supra note 83, at 223.
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Indeed, as WTO jurisprudence demonstrates, instruments outside of
the WTO covered agreements can be consulted to clarify obligations
under the WTO. In US.-Shrimp, for example, the Appellate Body, in
interpreting Article XiX(g) of the GATT, examined, among other
instruments, the Convention on Biological Diversity and UNCLOS.' 85
Likewise, in E.C.-Bananas,the Lom6 Convention played a critical role
European Union's rights and obligations pursuant to
in determining the186
Waiver.
Lom6
the
Undoubtedly, non-WTO policy considerations also colored the
WTO's decision to grant waivers in the cases of the Kimberley Process
Certification Scheme and the compulsory licensing of essential drugs to
developing countries. 187 Whereas the Kimberley Process addresses the
gross violations of human rights associated with "conflict diamonds," the
compulsory drug licensing waiver concerned the protection of the right
to life and health in developing countries! 88 As the policy concerns
underscoring these waivers go beyond matters of trade, these waivers
present additional examples contradicting the contention that the WTO is
a closed regime.
Furthermore, although governed by an agreement that merely
delineates the coordination of activities, in reality, the linkage between
the WTO and the United Nations goes far deeper.' 89 Indeed, nowhere is
this strong linkage more apparent than in Article XXI(c) of the GATT
(security exceptions), which states "Nothing in this Agreement shall be
construed.., to prevent any contracting party from taking any action in
pursuance of its obligations under the U.N. Charterfor the maintenance
of international peace and security."' 90 Under Chapter VII of the U.N.
Charter, the Security Council may, pursuant to Article 41 of the Charter,
place economic sanctions on States threatening international peace and
security. 19 1As Article 25 of the Charter requires that States must comply
with the decisions of the Security Council concerning mandatory
economic sanctions, Article92 XXI(c) ensures that WTO and UN
obligations will not conflict. 1
Given the role the WTO plays in creating the global problems we face
today, and given its ability to coordinate with other international
instruments and organizations, it is disappointing that the WTO has not
taken a more assertive stance on promoting human rights. Considering
185.

Id at 224.

186.

Id.

187. Desierto, supra note 61, at 53.
188.

Id.

189.
190.

WTO-U.N. Agreement, supranote 125.
GATT, supra note 10, art. XXI.

191.

Id.

192.

U.N. Charter art. 5, para. 25.
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that human rights violations are also being "dumped" alongside goods
onto politically, socially, and economically vulnerable countries such as
Colombia and Bangladesh, the WTO should take it upon itself to bear
some responsibility, as its nondiscrimination provisions mandate the
entry of these violations. Indeed, the WTO should acknowledge the fact
that although comparative advantage increases the global economic pie,
it nevertheless has distribution costs-meaning not everyone benefits
equally. Those who lose out on free trade suffer profusely. As activists
have noted, it is the voiceless peoples
of the developing world that
93
unfairly bear the brunt of free trade.'
Despite being subjected to exploitative wages and ghastly working
conditions, the poor of the developing world must continue to toil nonstop
as the economic and political health of their countries rests upon their
participation in the global trade regime. Truly, once embroiled in the
global economic system, there is no escape-no matter how abusive the
relationship becomes. This, then, is the dark side of free trade and
interdependency.
B. Suggested Solutions
Given the inequality that stems from the normal functioning of the
WTO, WTO policies must be recalibrated in a manner that more strongly
serves the interest of human rights. At the very least, for example, WTO
rights and obligations should be interpreted in a manner that does not
erode human rights protections. This approach to public international law
94
would essentially mirror the "Charming Betsy canon" approach.
Stemming from the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Murray v. The
Charming Betsy, 195 the Charming Betsy Cannon holds that U.S. laws
196
must be construed so as to not conflict with international law.
Interestingly, if U.S.-Gasoline is any indication, the Appellate Body
may already be headed down this road. Nevertheless, further efforts
should also be made to consult relevant intergovernmental human rights
organizations regularly so as to anticipatepotential conflicts before they
arise. As such actions are explicitly permitted under Article V of the
WTO Agreement, which states "The General Council shall make
appropriate arrangements for effective cooperation with other
intergovernmental organizations that have responsibilities related to
those of the WTO,"' 197 the WTO here would simply be taking the path of
193.

HERNANDEZ-TRUYOL & POWELL, supra note 8, at 2.

194. Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and SeparationofPowers: Rethinking
the InterpretiveRole ofInternationalLaw, 86 ARTHuR GEO. L.J. 480,482 (1998).
195. Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
196. Bradley, supra note 194, at 482.
197. WTO Agreement, supra note 43, art. V.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol27/iss2/3

24

Zonaid: Trading in Human Rights: Questioning the Advance of Human Rights
TRADING IN HUMAN RIGHTS: QUESTIONING THE ADVANCE OFHUMANRIGHTS

least resistance with respect to human rights.
The Appellate Body could also reduce the evidentiary burdens
associated with invoking the exceptions to the WTO agreements.
Members will need to bypass the WTO's nondiscrimination provisions if
they are to seek human rights compliance abroad (limiting market access
for Members engaged in human rights violations) and within their own
borders (using licenses to block imports). Indeed, judging by the current
state of WTO jurisprudence, this approach is entirely possible. As
illustrated by the China-Publications and Audiovisual Products
decision, the Appellate Body has discretion to reconfigure evidentiary
standards. 19 8 Although decided with regards to China's Ascension
Protocol, the Appellate Body in China-Publicationsand Audiovisual
Products nevertheless imposed a different, more rigorous standard for
invoking the "public morals" exception under GATT Article XX than it
an identical exception under GATS in U.S.-Gambling
did for 99
1
Services.
Although it may be argued that lowering evidentiary standards would
trigger a race to the bottom, it should be noted that WTO Members
continue to exercise considerable restraint with respect to security
exceptions found under Article XXI of the GATT. 20 0 As noted
previously, the security exceptions, given their self-judging component
and unclear reviewability, are essentially the ultimate loopholes for
escaping WTO obligations. 20 ' Despite this fact, however, Members have
202
displayed remarkable conservatism with respect to these provisions
and this may be because, echoing Sir Lauterpacht, °3 the prime goal of
States in the international arena is to protect collective economic
interests. In the eyes of Members then, a world with a global free trade
system may be better than a world without one.
On a more extreme note, the WTO framework is also modified to
offset the harsh realities associated with trade liberalization in the
developing world. Although treaties bind members no more than
reasonably necessary to satisfy the object and purpose of the treaty,20 4 as
discussed previously, the WTO is a Member-driven enterprise. Acting in
consensus, WTO Members have the ultimate discretion to determine
what the terms of the WTO Agreement are.

198. Desierto, supra note 61, at 27.
199. Id.
200. BosscHE & ZDOUC, supra note 133, at 595.
201. Alford, supra note 33, at 698-99.
202. BosscHE & ZDOUC, supra note 133, at 595.
203.
204.

LAUTERPACHT, supra note 1, at 72-73.
D'Acquisto & D'Avanzo, supra note 45, at 38.
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V. TIlE CASE FOR LIMITING TILE ADVANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS
A. The Value of Simplicity
The ongoing contentions surrounding human rights and the fact that
little overlap exists between trade and human rights goals 205 should lead
one to question the unrestrained comingling of trade and human rights,
especially in the context of the WTO-the world's most influential trade
organization. Long driven by its specific focus, the WTO, through the
efficiency and interdependency it fosters, continues to pave the way for
more sustainable global peace and prosperity. Considering its vast
potential to be used as a guise for protectionism, 20 6 however, human
rights has the potential to undercut the WTO's success.
The concept of human rights continues to remain a nebulous one.207
Despite the fact that six decades have passed since the adoption of the
UDHR, the world still does not have a clue as to what the notion of human
rights entails or even what rights are included under its canopy. 20 8 The
creation of two distinct conventions, ICCPR and ICESCR, delineating
and binding the rights enshrined in the UDHR signifies that a rift exists
as to the prioritization of rights. 20 9 Whereas the West favors civil and
political rights, the East is more apt to emphasize the value of
socioeconomic rights.2 10
Given the ambiguity and contention surrounding human rights,
excessively embroiling the WTO with human rights considerations
carries with it a number of undesirable consequences. Trade proponents
argue that injecting additional human considerations into the tradeoriented framework of the WTO amounts to "legal inflation." 211 Legal
inflation denotes the practice of states using trade agreements to globalize
their norms and values. 212 As the WTO is global in nature, the
introduction of additional human rights considerations may place the
WTO in the uncomfortable position of deciding to whose formulation of
human rights it wishes to adhere.
Expanding the existing framework WTO to incorporate additional
non-trade considerations may also have the effect of diluting the potency
of existing WTO rights and obligations. Overinclusiveness and excessive
complexity carries with it the risk of abuse. Members will undoubtedly
205. Whereas trade is driven by economic considerations, human rights are driven by moral
considerations. HERNANDEZ-TRUYOL & POWELL, supra note 8, at 64.
206. 3d WTO Ministerial Conference, supra note 110.
207. HERNANDEZ-TRUYOL & POWELL, supra note 8, at 20.
208. Id. at 244.
209. Id.

210. Id.
211.
212.

Aaronson, supra note 38, at 443.
Id.
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attempt to contort ambiguity in a manner that allows them to wiggle out
of their trade obligations. Truly, turning the WTO into a legal minefield
advances no one's interests, as developing and developed countries alike
would suffer from having no clear understanding of their rights and
obligations.
Furthermore, as the dispute settlement process is one of the prime
drivers of WTO's success, any and all changes affecting it should be
given the utmost consideration. As noted previously, the WTO's dispute
settlement process moves at a remarkable pace. 21 3 Under the current
framework, typically, it only takes nine months to a deliver a verdict on
the WTO-consistency of a disputed measure-an incredible
feat
214
tribunals.
international
most
of
pace
sloth-like
the
considering
Piling additional human rights considerations on top of trade
considerations jeopardizes the existing efficiency of WTO dispute
settlement. Additional fact finding, for example, may be required to
render decisions consistent with human rights obligations. With a docket
that is already always full, 2 15 the Appellate Body may find itself in the
precarious situation of addressing not just only more complaints, but
complaints of a more complex nature as well. As predictability and
consistency are the lifeblood of international trade and business, failure
on part of the WTO to deliver prompt verdicts may trigger political
backlash against the WTO, as trade and business interests generally tend
to comprise a powerful political contingent in any country.
If evidentiary burdens tied to the exceptions to the WTO are lowered,
the institutional legitimacy of the WTO may be jeopardized. Indeed, the
legal barriers surrounding the justified violations perform an important
gatekeeping function in that they seek to prevent Members from
conjuring smokescreens to evade their obligations. Truly, allowing
Members to play fast and loose with treaty obligations undermines the
very idea of capturing obligations in a treaty. If merely invoking human
rights was all that is required to be accepted from a WTO obligation, a
proverbial race to the bottom would ensue. Members would simply
invoke human rights to advance their interests.
Moreover, as demonstrated by the justified violations of the WTO
such as those found under Article XX of the GATT, consideration for
human rights already exists within the WTO.2 16 If met, the justified
violations of the WTO, permit a Member to suspend, within reason, their
binding trade obligations. 21 7 Indeed, the fact non-trade considerations can
completely override trade considerations within the WTO evidences that
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

Marceau, supra note 39, at 759.
Id.
Alford, supra note 33, at 698.
GATT, supra note 10, art. XX.
Id.
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the WTO recognizes that, where genuine, certain policy considerations
are deserving of primacy.
Owing to trade's many positive spillover effects, preserving the
WTO's limited focus may, in the long run, provide a greater aggregate
benefit to humanity. 218 As the world's only multilateral trade regime, the
WTO has enormous potential to improve the global human condition
even without ever having to lift a finger for human rights. It is
documented, for example, that free trade sustains and encourages
peaceful relations and reduces aggression among states.21 9 Indeed, trade
liberalization leads to specialization, which in turn leads to economic
interdependence among States, and once economic interdependence
becomes a fixture of
world affairs, little incentive exists for states in
220
breaching the peace.

Infusing more consideration for human rights into the WTO
framework, however, will endanger the relative peace that has ensues
from trade. If the evidentiary burdens for meeting an exception to the
WTO's requirements are lowered, for example, certain Members, like
China and Vietnam, 22 1 will undoubtedly face more institutional scrutiny
given ubiquity of concerns surrounding their human rights records.
Indeed, the resulting alienation and hostility may even provoke some
Members to leave the WTO-a highly undesirable consequence.
As WTO membership requires that states continually open their
borders to trade, States expose themselves to outside scrutiny when they
join the WTO. For the purposes of human rights, this fact is crucial
because WTO membership, at the very least, provides a glimpse into the
lives of people residing in even the most oppressive and censored
countries. When trade relations are formed, continuity and dialogue is
established with the world at large, and when this occurs, human rights
abuses are easier to detect. Indeed, it is arguable that if North Korea were
a Member of the WTO, its people would not live in the extreme of
conditions they do today. Global scrutiny and economic interdependence
would have likely chipped away at their government's excesses.
Further, as noted by scholars, free trade may be the only solution to
global poverty. 222 Oftentimes it is inefficiencies within a country that give
rise to poverty. 223 As free trade advantages the efficient, States can be
218.

219.
220.
221.
(Nov. 13,

HERNANDEZ-TRUYOL & POWELL, supra note 8, at 5.

Hegre et al., supranote 27, at 771-72.
See id.
See Elad Benari, Saudi Arabia, Russia and China Elected to UNHRC, ARUTZ SHEVA
2013 5:43 AM), http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/173950#.VS7H

KJTF8Vc.
222. See HERNANDEZ-TRUYOL & POWELL, supra note 8, at 6.
223. See generally PASCAL LAMY, THE GENEVA CONSENSUS: MAKING TRADE WORK FOR

ALL (2013).
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rendered more economically capable and efficient by joining the WTO.
Reductions in "rent-seeking" practices illustrate how States can be
made more efficient by trade liberalization."2 4 Rent-seeking is the
practice of increasing profits without increasing value for customers or,
as the Economist describes it, "Cutting yourself a bigger slice of the cake
rather than making the cake bigger." 225 Although a number of different
practices constitute rent-seeking, in the typical rent-seeking scenario, a
firm or group of firms lobby the government for favorable policies at the
expense of taxpayers, consumers, or rivals.226 While profits soar for the
lobbying firms, a nation's economy often suffers as a whole because of
the rent-seeking-a
practice that both stifles competition and retards
2 27
innovation.

Complicating matters is the fact that rent-seeking behavior creates and
perpetuates monopolies. As monopolies enjoy disproportionate
bargaining power in the markets in which they operate, monopolies
inherently have dangerous potential to stagnate a State's economy by
creating and sustaining artificial inefficiencies. By setting prices below
market, for example, a monopoly can squeeze out all competition in a
given market. When businesses exit in droves, they leave unemployment
in their wake. Unemployment, in turn, gives rise to misery and tension
within a state.
Conducted properly, free trade offers a potent solution to the problem
of rent-seekers. Indeed, once a state opens its borders and markets to
foreign competition, states may begin to realize that the inefficiencies
caused by monopolies and rent-seekers constitutes a comparative
disadvantage.In this situation, a State would most likely move to curb
the rent-seeker's influence or eliminate it altogether. Moreover, in the
event that a state continues to accommodate or outright favor rentseekers, legal remedies are available for WTO members in the event that
rent-seekers are benefiting
from prohibited or discriminatorily
228
administered policies.
Illustrating this phenomenon is the WTO's recent decision in ChinaElectronicPaperServices.22 9 In that case, the United States alleged that
China discriminated against U.S. bank card issuers by favoring a state224. See Arye Hillman, International Trade Policy: Departure from Free Trade, in
481, 493 (Charles
Rowley & Friedrich Schneider eds., Springer 2008).
225. Economics A-Z Terms Beginning with R, ECONOMIST.COM, http://www.economist.
com/economics-a-to-z/r (last visited Apr. 5, 2014).
226. Paul M. Johnson, A Glossary of Political Economy Terms, AUBURN.EDU,
http://www.aubum.edu/-johnspm/gloss/rent-seeking behavior (last visited Apr. 5, 2014).
227. See id.
228. See GATT, supra note 10, art. III (National Treatment).
229. Panel Report, China-Certain Measures Affecting Electronic Payment Services,
WT/DS413/R (July 16, 2012).
READINGS IN PUBLIC CHOICE AND CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY
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owned enterprise called China UnionPay (CUP) that enjoys monopoly
power.230 By permitting only CUP to handle renminbi-based electronic
card transactions, foreign purveyors, such as Visa and American Express,
were forced to service only electronic card transactions involving foreign
currency. 23 1 Whereas foreign card service purveyors would need to
negotiate with individual merchants for access, China guaranteed that
CUP would have access to all merchants. 232 Finding that China failed to
provide national treatment to foreign purveyors of electronic card
services as required by GATS,
the Panel held that CUP illegally
233
controlled the Chinese market.
B. Suggested Solutions
Although trade benefits can be extended by means of a simple trade
agreement, WTO membership nevertheless carries with it several special
benefits. First, the WTO is a truly global enterprise. With a membership
roster consisting of the vast majority of the world's states, including all
of the major trading states, WTO membership provides states with access
to an unparalleled trade network. Illustrating is the fact that "WTO
Member States and applicant countries account for 99.95 percent of
world trade, 99.97 percent of the world Gross Domestic Product (GDP),
and 99.30 percent of the world's population." 234 Upon ascension to the
WTO, Members instantaneously gain access to valuable benefits, such as
Most Favored Nation status, without
having to negotiate individually
235
states.
different
hundred
a
over
with
Second, WTO membership provides access to a highly competent and
efficient dispute settlement procedure. Whereas volatility may follow in
the event of a breach of a regular bilateral treaty obligation, WTO
members and their individual business sectors have, at the very least, the
comfort of knowing their grievances will be addressed quickly by a
readily accessible and competent dispute settlement procedure. As
international businesses strive to achieve predictability and consistency,
the value of the WTO's dispute settlement procedure cannot be
understated.
Third and last, WTO membership considerably levels the playing field
between smaller, economically insignificant states and large, powerful
230.
231.

See id.
Id.

2.4.

232. Id.
233. Id. 8.1 &8.2.
234. Alford, supra note 33, at 697.
235. Understanding the WTO: Principles of the Trading System, WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION, https://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatis-e/tif e/fact2_e.htm (last visited
Apr. 15, 2015).
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states. In U.S.-Gambling Services, the Appellate Body ruled in favor of
the small island nation of Antigua in complaint it brought against the
United States. 236 There, Antigua alleged that the cumulative impact of
three U.S. anti-racketeering laws effectively barred the provision of
gambling services by Antiguan-domiciled sources. 237 Finding that the
United States committed its gambling sector when it made its original
Uruguay Round commitments in 1995, the Appellate Body ruled that
2 38
Antigua was entitled to suspend concessions to the United States.
Although such David and Goliath situations typically result in a victory
for Goliath on the international stage, WTO membership clearly has the
potential to provide an occasional victory for David.
For the 37 states 239 that are not currently members of the WTO, the
WTO undoubtedly looks like a highly lucrative venture from the outside
looking in. By taking advantage of this fact in the admissionsprocess, the
WTO has a valuable opportunity to shape the human rights records of
prospective members. As many of the 37 nonmember states also happen
240
to be major human rights offenders, such as North Korea and Somalia,
from the human fights perspective, it would make sense to condition
membership on the improvement of human fights records. Indeed, the
WTO would both benefit itself and the progress of human fights with
little or no cost to itself.
To guarantee human rights compliance after admission into the WTO,
a framework incorporating a graduation provision like China's WTO
Ascension Protocol could be implemented. Under this system, in
exchange for continued compliance to both trade and human fights
norms, new Members will eventually graduate into full WTO benefits.
Such a solution is ideal as it will in no way, shape, or form impinge upon
the rights and obligations of existing Members.
VI. THE MIDDLE GROUND: BILATERAL FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS

Given their limited reach, it is in FTAs and RTAs that human rights
concerns should be addressed. Consideration for contentious issues in
FTAs and RTAs pose no major threat to the overall framework of the
WTO, as only the parties to the FTA or RTA are bound by the agreement.
As stated under Article XXIV of the GATT, Members are permitted to
form free trade areas and customs unions so long as they keep their other
236. Appellate Body Report, United States-MeasuresAffecting the Cross-BorderSupply
of Gambling and Betting Services, 373, WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005).
237. Id. 2.
238. Id. 374.
239. MEMBERS AND OBSERVERS, supranote 7.
240. Id.
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WTO obligations intact.241 Provided they abide by the terms set forth by
the WTO, no matter what policy considerations underscore the FTA or
RTA, Members 242
are free to engage in "WTO plus" arrangements with
other Members.

Interestingly, consideration for human rights in such agreements dates
back thousands of years. 243 Although the ancients, for example,
recognized the value of trade, they were nevertheless uncertain as to the
intentions of those with whom they traded.244 Along with bringing
valuable goods, foreign traders, for example, could also bring looting and
slavery. 245 In order to curb the likelihood of hostility, the ancients devised
agreements with trading partners that would ensure basic freedoms and
opportunities.246

In the same vein, modem states have also begun to use agreements to
advance human rights concerns. 247 Both the European Union and the
United States, for example, frequently address human and labor concerns
in their FTAs. 248 In fact, so ubiquitous are these agreements
that they now
249
comprise an important facet of international relations.
Under modem FTAs or RTAs, relatively less powerful states are
given "WTO plus" concessions by powerful agenda driven international
actors such as the European Union and the United States in exchange for
increased human rights compliance. 250 NAFTA, for example, requires
that Mexico, provide adequate labor protections and also limit its
negative impact on the environment-two concerns neither clearly nor
25 1
adequately addressed under the more general WTO agreements.
Although a particular interpretation of labor and environment may be
imposed on Mexico by NAFTA, such as those held by activists and
lobbyists in the United States, the fact that Mexico is receiving valuable
economic incentives in exchange for the assumption of "WTO plus" trade
obligations nevertheless makes these NAFTA provisions less
disagreeable.
Despite the fact that the WTO Agreement binds and limits state
241. GATT, supra note 10, art. XXIV.
242. Kawai & Wignaraja, supranote 135, at 17-18.
243. Susan Ariel Aaronson & Jean Pierre Chauffour, The Wedding of Trade and Human
Rights: Marriage of Convenience or Permanent Match?, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,

available at http://www.wto.org/english/res-e/publications-e/wtrl lforume/wtr 11_15feb11 _e.
htm.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Bartels, supra note 149, at 1.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 6.
251. See generally Gantz, supra note 145.
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sovereignty on matters of trade, WTO Members nevertheless have
considerable discretion in pursuing their policy agendas even where it
implicates WTO rights and obligations. This happens to be why exchange
of "WTO plus" benefits and obligations is permitted under FTAs. 52 The
inclusion of exceptions to the WTO obligations and Article XXIV of the
GATT, for example, reflects the belief that States should be given leeway
where their objectives mirror the overarching objective of the WTO-which is to promote free trade and facilitate global integration. 253 Indeed,
if this were not the case, it is arguable that the WTO would not enjoy the
popularity it does today as states generally tend to strongly rebuff
encroachments onto their sovereign rights.
Given the global nature of the WTO, this arrangement is a preferable
one. As noted previously, the existence of the ICCPR and ICESCR
suggests that a rift exists with respect to the prioritization of human rights
concerns. 25 4 By excluding direct references to human rights in the
overarching WTO Agreement and by permitting the consideration of
contentious issues in individual FTAs, the WTO essentially freed itself
from deciding to whose formulation of human rights it should adhere.
States, for example, with strong national identities and histories of
struggling against colonialism, such as China and India, would have most
likely resisted joining an organization like the WTO if it had meant they
would resubmitting to the paternalism of their former colonial
oppressors. Whereas alienation and the formation of trade blocs would
plague a more exhaustive human rights oriented treaty, by remaining
general in its rights and obligations, the WTO is essentially able to
capture a greater audience, and, therefore, play a greater role in trade
affairs.
In the event of fallout between states party to an FTA, having a
specific overarching agreement that continues to govern is important for
a number of reasons. First, with respect to global peace and security,
states are less likely to engage in aggression if dialogue continues even
after a particular disagreement occurs. By requiring that States extend
their concessions on an MFN basis, the WTO ensures precisely this
scenario.2 55 WTO Members cannot, without violating the WTO
Agreement, suspend trade relations with another Members solely on the
basis that a conflict occurred with that particular Member. 256 Indeed, this
would be a clear violation of the Article I of the GATT's MFN
requirement.2 5 7 In this situation, the Member on the receiving end of trade
252. GATT, supra note 10, art. XXIV(5).
253. Id. art. XXIV(4).
254.
255.

HERNANDEZ-TRUYOL & POWELL, supra note 8, at 244.
GATT, supra note 10, art. I.

256.

Id.

257.

Id.
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suspensions is empowered to initiate dispute settlement in order to force
strict compliance.
Second, as previously stated, continuously keeping borders open is
critical to monitoring human rights violations. When states open their
borders to trade, they subject themselves to international scrutiny with
respect to their internal affairs whether they like it or not. This is
essentially a positive byproduct of the interdependency that results from
linking states with specialized economies together. If it chooses to
partake in the global framework for free trade, even the most despotic and
controlling of regimes must reveal some of its inner workings for the
purposes of conducting trade relations. In this sense, trade is a powerful
means by which the international community can expose human rights
abuses.
VII. CONCLUSION
With respect to WTO affairs, it is not the mere consideration of human
rights that should cause alarm; rather, it is the unrestrainedadvance of
human rights considerations. Truly, the WTO's specialization can be
likened to an American tax court. One would not, for example, seek to
prosecute a war criminal in a tax court, as there are separate and more
appropriate forums suited for that purpose. Likewise, as specialized
alternative forums exist for the consideration of human rights matters,
such as the ICJ and the International Criminal Court, one should not
expect to bring such issues before a trade tribunal.
The fact that trade implicates serious human rights concerns is both
inevitable and regrettable. Trade and human rights are both fundamental
fixtures of world affairs and do not, as previously thought, exist in
isolation from one another. For this reason, our attitudes toward these two
endeavors should not be colored by personal beliefs and motivations, as
a balancing of both interests is required to solve today's borderless
problems. Whereas trade creates the infrastructure for global
interdependency, human rights reinforces this interdependency and, in
turn, gives it a more moral, human touch.
A collaborative spirit is needed now more so than any other time in
history given that our interconnected world has spawned interconnected
problems. Where possible and convenient, the WTO should work with
human rights organizations to craft solutions that provide due respect to
both trade and human rights interests. Treading the path of least
resistance, tremendous strides can be made to limit the most egregious
abuses associated with trade such as child labor and human trafficking.
The WTO, however, should not blindly subscribe to human rights
norms, as there are cognizable dangers associated with allowing non-
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economic considerations to dictate trade relations. This concern
underscores the evidentiary burdens tied to the current exceptions found
in the WTO framework. Although recognizing that noneconomic public
policy concerns should at times be given priority, it is only when these
concerns rise to the level of genuineness that a WTO Member is permitted
to suspend trade obligations.
We should not overlook the fact that trade concessions are negotiated.
Truly, there is manifest injustice in allowing one Member to unilaterally
suspend benefits to another Member while still requiring the latter to
extend benefits to the former. It is for this reason that restrictions must be
placed on matters tangential to the overarching framework.
States seeking an outlet in trade affairs to address human rights
concerns need not end their search with the WTO. Alternative measures
in the form of free trade agreements are more than reasonably available.
Permitted and encouraged by the WTO, these agreements allow states to
barter, in exchange for benefits beyond those conferred by WTO, for
enhanced human rights obligations. NAFTA is one prominent example
of how human rights concerns can be incorporated a trade agreement
conferring "WTO plus" benefits.
Given the differing worldviews of WTO members, it would be wise
of the WTO to steer clear of moral politics. Moreover, from a functional
perspective, an umbrella agreement supplemented by independent, selfcontained extensions just makes sense. This is due to the fact that even if
the more specialized agreement dissolves, the overarching trade
framework and the benefits that accompany it remain intact. For the sake
of peace and security, it is preferable-even necessary-to preserve the
steady flow of trade at all times. If the aggressions that stemmed from
trade restrictions during the Interwar period are any indication, the world
suffers when economic links deteriorate.
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